En su obra principal “Crítica de la razón pura”, Kant deja clara su intención de no solo investigar las cualidades epistemológicas del ser humano, sino también de fundamentar las ciencias naturales. Principalmente la física y las matemáticas. El libro “Fundamentaciones metafísicas de las ciencias naturales” continua este proyecto. En su prólogo se excluye aún más a ambas ciencias, al catalogarlas como las únicas portadoras de conocimientos sintéticos a priori. Los problemas surgen con la “Crítica del Juicio” y su apartado “Crítica (...) del Juicio teleológico”. Aquí, Kant intenta legitimar la biología como ciencia natural sin invadir el campo ocupado por la física matemática. El resultado es una biología que porta conocimientos necesarios pero que al mismo tiempo no puede brindarnos leyes constitutivas de la naturaleza. Esta nueva ciencia natural se torna irreconciliable con el sistema de las ciencias naturales que Kant mismo había planteado en sus libros anteriores. (shrink)

This volume has 41 chapters written to honor the 100th birthday of Mario Bunge. It celebrates the work of this influential Argentine/Canadian physicist and philosopher. Contributions show the value of Bunge’s science-informed philosophy and his systematic approach to philosophical problems. The chapters explore the exceptionally wide spectrum of Bunge’s contributions to: metaphysics, methodology and philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of physics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of social science, philosophy of biology, philosophy of technology, moral philosophy, social and (...) political philosophy, medical philosophy, and education. The contributors include scholars from 16 countries. Bunge combines ontological realism with epistemological fallibilism. He believes that science provides the best and most warranted knowledge of the natural and social world, and that such knowledge is the only sound basis for moral decision making and social and political reform. Bunge argues for the unity of knowledge. In his eyes, science and philosophy constitute a fruitful and necessary partnership. Readers will discover the wisdom of this approach and will gain insight into the utility of cross-disciplinary scholarship. This anthology will appeal to researchers, students, and teachers in philosophy of science, social science, and liberal education programmes. 1. Introduction Section I. An Academic Vocation Section II. Philosophy Section III. Physics and Philosophy of Physics Section IV. Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Mind Section V. Sociology and Social Theory Section VI. Ethics and Political Philosophy Section VII. Biology and Philosophy of Biology Section VIII. Mathematics Section IX. Education Section X. Varia Section XI. Bibliography. (shrink)

This paper proposes that we read a late work of Georg Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, as an indispensable contribution to ontological investigation in general and particularly to the understanding of social reality. As the ontology of Lukács tends not to be familiar even to those who have foregrounded ontological issues in recent decades, it seems to be extremely fruitful to bring it into discussion. Comparing the analysis of Lukács with the ontology of critical realism, we argue that it (...) is not only possible to identify obvious convergences but also to shed light on many questions that still demand a proper treatment from an ontological perspective. (shrink)

This paper proposes that we read a late work of Georg Lukács, The Ontology of Social Being, as an indispensable contribution to ontological investigation in general and particularly to the understanding of social reality. As the ontology of Lukács tends not to be familiar even to those who have foregrounded ontological issues in recent decades, it seems to be extremely fruitful to bring it into discussion. Comparing the analysis of Lukács with the ontology of critical realism, we argue that it (...) is not only possible to identify obvious convergences but also to shed light on many questions that still demand a proper treatment from an ontological perspective. (shrink)

Leonardo Polo proposes a diversity of times according to its difference with regard to the mental presence as actuality, from which it is necessary to differ, in turn, the now, though one and another are of mental condition. We propose different levels of knowledge to understand the now in sensible things, but not without the intellectual circular objectivation, based in an interpretation of the Aristotelian notion of the hò pote ón.

Se glosa el método poliano del abandono del limite mental como un 'trascendimiento' de la presencia - la cual detiene el inteligir objetivante y como actualidad lo separa de la actuosidad y dinamismo reales-. Se excluye así la extrapolación de la actualidad presencial como forma del ente sustancial tanto como su reducción a determinación efectiva a manera de modalidad del juicio asertivo. De donde se interpreta la distinción real de la esencia potencial con respecto al acto de ser creado que (...) la trasciende - sin separación- como el inherente distinguirse de posibilidades temporalmente desplegado por este acto, y se averigua la real distinción entre la primalidad radical que compete al acto de ser principal - extramental- y al intrínsecamente dual- personal humano-. (shrink)

This article offers a commentary on some passages of the Introduction to the second volume of the Antropología trascendental, where Polo proposes the act of human being according to the character of además, which is equivalent to the personal living in view of its conversion, on a transcendental level, with the personal freedom and the intimacy as higher transcendentals than those of principial being. In addition, the decrease of essential level proceeding from these personal transcendentals is equivalent to the essential (...) human life increasing without restriction, in which natural organic individual life is actively received, and which is thereby spiritually revitalized. (shrink)

La comprensión moderna del movimiento físico resulta insuficiente para tematizar la incidencia en él de la causalidad final. La confusión de la finalidad física con algún tipo de noción formal lastra incluso la física filosófica de Aristóteles. Se propone entender la causa final física como un principio real, no mental, que guía "induce o atrae" la variación formal, sólo actuante junto con las otras causas que el Estagirita sienta, y cuya influencia en las tricausalidades cinéticas es la razón última del (...) despliegue evolutivo de éstas dentro del cosmos. (shrink)

Con base en un texto de Polo se glosa su noción de libertad como trascendental del ser personal humano, en cuanto que equivalente a la índole puramente metódica de la intrínsecamente dual condición "actuosa" del carácter de además como acto de ser que se convierte con la persona humana, distinto del ser trascendental con carácter de principio.

In this paper, after briefly reviewing and explaining the access to God in Polo's philosophy, according to the four ways of the "abandonment of mental limit" method, and showing what can be gained from each of them, I gloss the way of a possible access into the Intimacy of the divine as Origin. I hold that, while we cannot acquire an ultimate access to it, we can conclude at least that it is impossible for this Intimacy to be intrinsically solitary. (...) The consequences of this doctine are then expounded. (shrink)

La comprensión moderna del movimiento físico resulta insuficiente para tematizar la incidencia en él de la causalidad final. La confusión de la finalidad física con algún tipo de noción formal lastra incluso la física filosófica de Aristóteles. Se propone entender la causa final física como un principio real, no mental, que guía —induce o atrae— la variación formal, sólo actuante junto con las otras causas que el Estagirita sienta, y cuya influencia en las tricausalidades cinéticas es la razón última del (...) despliegue evolutivo de éstas dentro del cosmos. (shrink)

Standing upon Leonardo Polo's interpretation about Aristotle's doctrine on sensitive cognition, some aspects of the sensorial organical inmutation required in it are examined, and a thesis concerning de common sense as center and root of sensibility -not only exterior, but also interior- is suggested. According to this thesis, even the sensorial and organical inmutations belonging to the other internal senses can return to de organ of the common sense, which becomes the central and radical organ. Therefore all sensible objectivation (...) should take place in the common sense. This conclusion does not agree with Polo's position. (shrink)

Leonardo Polo propone diversidad de tiempos de acuerdo con su diferencia con respecto a la presencia mental como actualidad, de la que cabe, a su vez, diferenciar el ahora, si bien una y otro son de condición anímica. Se proponen distintos niveles de conocimiento del ahora en lo sensible, mas no sin la objetivación intelectual de lo circular, con base en una interpretación de la noción aristotélica de hò pote ón..

Es a todas luces evidente que los cambios globales de las últimas décadas, connotados entre otras cuestiones por el desplazamiento masivo de personas y la consolidación de identidades nacionales más borrosas y cambiantes, han repercutido de una manera significativa sobre el mundo académico, con la consecuente renovación de sus intereses. El auge adquirido por el estudio del exilio en América latina forma parte de esta nueva realidad. A la diversificación temática y aparición de nuevos y más sofisticados enfoques se han (...) sumado numerosos congresos y jornadas de estudio y debate, una importante cantidad de libros y artículos y la consolidación de grupos y redes de investigación internacionales. La publicación de Exile, Diaspora and Return es una prueba de este auge. Representa una excelente puesta al día de los alcances y sutileza de los estudios más recientes, a la vez que da cuenta de las decisivas vinculaciones de la cuestión con temas amplios como la globalización, los cambios en la idea de ciudadanía o las transiciones democráticas... (shrink)

Este estudio se centra en el recorrido y desarrollo de Mario Conde, detective protagonista de las ocho novelas policiales del escritor cubano Leonardo Padura. De la tetralogía que se inicia con Pasado Perfecto,en 1991, hasta la ambiciosa y última entrega de Herejes, en 2013, Conde actúa mayormente dentro del “período especial” cubano marcado por la debacle de la Unión Soviética, para arribar a la primera década del siglo XXI. Dicho “período especial” produjo un quiebre en el desarrollo del (...) género policial en Cuba. Por lo tanto, el género policial revolucionario, con apoyo oficial que nace a comienzos de la década de los 70, se transforma en los 90 para insertarse en la vertiente neopolicial que el resto de Latinoamérica venía desarrollando desde una década antes.Lejos de los personajes modélicos revolucionarios del género en su origen, el neopolicial de Padura crea personajes que resuelven crímenes y delitos pero a la vez delinquen y evaden la ley. A partir de los casos que investiga, Conde se mueve dentro de esa paradójica conducta, al mismo tiempo que deconstruye y desmitifica las grandes políticas y discursos revolucionarios. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Towards a Design-Based Analysis of Emotional Episodes”Cristiano Castelfranchi (bio) and Maria Miceli (bio)Keywordsgrief, suffering, attachment, agent architectureThis paper is significant in many respects: its approach (the design-based analysis); its proposed architecture; its description of grief; and its self-control/perturbance theory. We would offer some remarks on each of these aspects.AI: Back to the FutureAfter some years of crisis, AI seems now to have recovered its original challenging (...) attitude and its identity. In particular all the original ambitions of AI have been renewed under the label of “autonomous agents” (see, for example, Russell and Norvig 1995; Wooldridge and Jennings 1995). This paper and its authors are good representatives of this challenging attitude. Of course, the AI appearing at century’s end is different from, say, the AI of the 1980s. AI systems and models are now conceived for reasoning and acting in open unpredictable worlds, with limited and uncertain knowledge, in real time, with bounded (both cognitive and material) resources, with hybrid architectures, interfering—either co-operatively or competitively—with other systems. The new password for the AI of the 1990s is interaction (Bobrow 1991): interaction with an evolving environment; among several, distributed and heterogeneous artificial systems in a network; with human users; and among humans through computers.This renewed AI, however different though it is in some ways, can be understood as returning to its original aim of modeling “intelligence”: not only static and isolated sub-functions of intelligence but the integrated and pragmatic functioning of autonomous agent architectures as against algorithms. Our renewed AI, based on architectures, can again have important exchanges with other (psychological and social) sciences. This paper is a good example of the fruitful cross-fertilization of ideas which may result from such exchanges. It was indeed just this which originally gave rise to cognitive science.The ArchitectureThe proposed architecture, although quite speculative, and—as the authors themselves emphasize—very much a first sketch, is directly relevant to this new AI. In fact, recent research efforts in the agent-architecture domain are focused exactly on the problem of “goal dynamics” [End Page 129] or “motive processing,” which is the core of this architecture, and on the problem of integrating reactivity and deliberation. Compared with current AI architectures (for example, BDI systems) it is important to note that this “motive-processing” architecture is not yet formalized or implemented to the same extent. On the other hand, it is more interesting from a psychological point of view, and is already able to give us some important insights into human emotions, in particular those emotions (like grief) that involve all or total loss of control of management processes.The Report-Based Analysis of GriefThe report-based description of grief provides a persuasive and rich basis for both modeling and discussing the model. The relevant features of this emotion are well characterized with reference to the self-control problem and motive-processing (though, as we shall see, to use grief as an example of those emotions that involve all or total loss of control of thought processes may provide a partially distorted view of grief itself). In particular, we would stress the relevance of the “intrusive” character of grief-related contents; the rejection of certain beliefs due to the psychic pain they cause; the coping strategies people describe; and the second order motivations related to the control of the emotional state. We believe that psychological models especially of these aspects are usually less specific and explanatory.Let us now try to synthesize some criticisms one could advance of this analysis. We will first address two core notions of the model—perturbance and self-control—and then consider more specifically the treatment of grief.PerturbanceThis notion is potentially very interesting, unless it is reduced to an information processing perspective (e.g., perturbance of attentive processes). An information processing perspective is much more limited than a motive-processing one—at least in the limitative sense of the term, as it is generally used in the psychology of cognitive processes—and is in our view insufficient for understanding human emotions and their role. This limiting interpretation of perturbance fails... (shrink)

We present an analysis of emotional experience in terms of beliefs and desires viewed as its minimal cognitive constituents. We argue that families of emotions can be identified because their members share some of these constituents. To document this claim, we analyze one family of emotions—which includes the feeling of inferiority, admiration, envy, and jealousy—trying to show that the distinctiveness of each emotion is due to the specific compound of beliefs and desires it implies, whereas the kinship among related emotions (...) is due to their sharing of cognitive or motivational components. Finally, we address the gestalt problem, that is, the question of how it is possible that emotions, although consisting of several “atomic” elements, are felt as unitary experiences. (shrink)

Research on whistle-blowing has been hampered by a lack of a sound theoretical base. In this paper, we draw upon existing theories of motivation and power relationships to propose a model of the whistle-blowing process. This model focuses on decisions made by organization members who believe they have evidence of organizational wrongdoing, and the reactions of organization authorities. Based on a review of the sparse empirical literature, we suggest variables that may affect both the members' decisions and the organization's responses.

Who blows the whistle — a loner or a well-liked team player? Which of them is more likely to lead a successful opposition to perceived organizational wrongdoing? The potential influence of co-worker pressures to conform on whistle-blowing activity or the likely effects of whistle-blowing on the group have not been addressed. This paper presents a preliminary model of whistle-blowing as an act of nonconformity. One implication is that the success of an opposition will depend on the characteristics of the whistle-blower (...) and how the complaint is pursued. Specific hypotheses and general suggestions for future research and practice are offered. (shrink)

Transhumanisms, as cultural, philosophical, and ideological movements that permeate various areas of technical and scientific knowledge, have caused a rupture in Western philosophical praxis by asserting the possibility of genetic enhancement of the human being through biotechnoscientific procedures. However, the biophysical alterations advocated by transhumanists are not limited to the somatic and psychic realms; they encompass humanity as a whole, including moral aspects. In this sense, the aim of this article is to demonstrate the ethical and political impacts concerning human (...) moral enhancement, highlighting to what extent our freedom may be threatened by such practices. After all, is it possible to genetically enhance our morality? Should we enhance our dispositional moral traits through biotechnoscientific procedures? Faced with these questions, we will first analyze how human moral enhancement can interfere with our freedom as human beings, and then we will examine how human enhancement has become a moral urgency for transhumanists. (shrink)

The folk Psychology frames propositional attitudes as fundamental theoretical entities for the construction of a model designed to predict the behavior of a subject. A trivial, such as grasping a pen and writing reveals - something complex - about the behavior. When I take a pen and start writing I do, trivially, because I believe that a certain object in front of me is a pen and who performs a specific function that is, in fact, that of writing. When I (...) believe that the object that stands before me is a pen, I am in relation to "believe" with the propositional content: that in front of me is a pen. Philosophers of the proposition, from Frege onwards, have dedicated their studies to the analysis of what kinds of entities are the propositional attitudes. Jerry Fodor says that now, the proper prediction of the psychology of common sense, can not be questioned and that the propositional attitudes represent the most effective way to describe our behavior. What Fodor says, however, is that propositional attitudes function, but not how they work. Most philosophers interested in the issue, we are dedicated to the search for a theory that can account consistently both a semantics for propositional attitudes, both of these entities that seem to cause the behavior of a rational subject. There are two main paradigms in the theory of the proposition that contributed to the discussion of the propositional attitudes. One is the one that begins with Gottlob Frege, the other with Bertrand Russell. Defenders of Frege argue that the paradigm scrub objects and properties can not be constituents of the propositional content which have a purely conceptual. In other words, the philosophers belonging to the paradigm of Frege, but not all, mean that you can test in a rigorous way the truth conditions of propositional attitudes. Who defends the russellian’s paradigm argues that the propositional content are made by the objects and properties on which propositional attitudes relate. The purpose of this article is not to rebuild - in detail - both paradigms, nor to reconstruct one but, in a sense, my work will be a completely partial objective is to demonstrate how the paradigm is more profitable russell not only to make a coherent semantic theory for propositional attitudes2 but also to predict the behavior of a rational subject thing, completely innovative, given the repeated objections in contemporary literature3. At the end of this paper will be drafted a proposal to build a consistent model to predict the behavior,of a rational agent, based on a referential theory of propositional attitudes. (shrink)

Proof-theoretic semantics is an inferentialist theory of meaning, usually developed in a multiple-assumption and single-conclusion framework. In that framework, this theory seems unable to justify classical logic, so some authors have proposed a multiple-conclusion reformulation to accomplish this goal. In the first part of this paper, the debate originated by this proposal is briefly exposed and used to defend the diverging opinion that proof-theoretic semantics should always endorse a single-assumption and single-conclusion framework. In order to adopt this approach some of (...) its _criteria_ of validity, especially separability, need to be weakened. This choice is evaluated and defended. The main argument in this direction is based on the circular dependences of meaning between multiple assumptions and conjunctions, and between multiple conclusions and disjunctions. In the second part of this paper, some systems that suit the new requirements are proposed for both intuitionistic and classical logic. A proof that they are valid, according to the weakened _criteria_, is sketched. (shrink)

Sfruttando alcune considerazioni, presenti in Richard (1997), riguardo questioni pragmatiche e psicologiche connesse alla semantica russelliana per i verbi psicologici si propone un modello teorico in cui, attraverso l’introduzione di alcuni enunciati strategici, ad es. “Lois non realizza che Superman è Clark Kent”, alcuni problemi connessi al diverso comportamento di Lois con gli individui Superman e Clark Kent, sembrerebbero risolti fornendoci corrette predizioni riguardo il comportamento di un agente razionale. Scopo di questo lavoro è estendere il modello ad alcuni casi (...) riguardanti l’etica delle credenze e mostrare, attraverso un caso paradigmatico nella letteratura specialistica, alcune potenziali conferme empiriche del modello stesso. (shrink)

Basandomi su (Harvey 2012) argomenterò che la struttura architettonica della città deve seguire un determinato modello morale: gli edifici devono adattarsi alla persone e alle loro esigenze, e non il contrario. Definita la città come un particolare tipo di oggetto sociale, difenderò la tesi della possibilità di cambiamento “qui e ora” delle strutture architettoniche delle città sulla base del modello che, come mostra (Sudjic 2011), è attualmente ribaltato in una situazione in cui gli agglomerati urbani seguono sostanzialmente una struttura che (...) sposa le sole esigenze dei costruttori. Una volta argomentato che la città deve tenere conto degli interessi di tutti, modificando di continuo le proprie strutture, mi baserò su (Frau 2009) per sostenere che la città deve anche trasformarsi in un luogo in cui anche i “ diversi” (malati mentali, ecc.) trovano un loro spazio non dissimile da chi è definito “normale”. (shrink)

Here we prove the existence of sheaf cohomology theory in arbitrary o-minimal structures.

The aim of this essay is to provide an overview of New Realism in its opposition and reaction to Postmodernism. An analysis of the implications of both philosophical approaches in diverse fields will be offered, from epistemology, to politics, to ethics. Ethical new realism is presented as particularly promising and important to the future of philosophy.

L'articolo ha come obiettivo quello di dimostrare come il paradigma russelliano risulti più proficuo non soltanto per rendere coerente una teoria semantica per gli atteggiamenti proposizionali ma anche per predire il comportamento di un agente razionale cosa, del tutto innovativa, viste le continue ciritiche nella letteratura contemporanea. Sul finire dell'articolo viene abbozzata una proposta inedita volta alla costruzione di un modello - inquadrato nelle scienze cognitive - coerente per prevedere il comportamento di un agente razionale sulla base di una teoria (...) referenzialista degli atteggiamenti proposizionali. (shrink)

We introduce a family of notions of interpolation for sentential logics. These concepts generalize the ones for substructural logics introduced in [5]. We show algebraic characterizations of these notions for the case of equivalential logics and study the relation between them and the usual concepts of Deductive, Robinson, and Maehara interpolation properties.